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Systems
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Abstract—In this paper we formulate the problem of econom-
ically optimal and reliable spatial distribution of power balance
ancillary services in electrical power networks. Furthermore,
we propose a novel price-based (market-based) approach for
scheduling of the control services in which we explicitly take
into account limited capacity of transmission network. A novel
notion of nodal pricing for power balance control services is
introduced while constructive solution for calculation of nodal
prices is presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The power balancing Ancillary (control) Services (AS)
markets are forward time markets1 whose goal is to cope
with uncertainties that are inherently present in forward time
decision making actions. The related forward time decisions
considered in this paper are energy balancing actions, that
is, balancing the power system “on paper”, which takes
place before the actual operation. The energy balancing is
achieved by market clearing (finding equilibrium of demand
and supply) in forward time energy markets. After the energy
markets are cleared, the AS market clearing takes place.
The quantities traded on the AS markets are options to de-
liver/retrieve additional energy within some predefined time
interval if needed. In real-time, these options are called into
operation by the corresponding transmission system operator
(TSO) via appropriately designed feedback control loops,
the so-called secondary control loops [1]. Forward time AS
markets are aimed to ensure enough controllable prosump-
tion (production/consumption) units that will be committed
to act as actuators in the secondary control feedback loops.
Loosely speaking, secondary control loops are responsible to
cover for the “gaps” in between forward time made plans and
real-time situation, while purchasing AS in forward time has
to ensure that the saturation limits of the secondary control
loops will be sufficiently large to cope with the expected
sizes of these “gaps”.
In [2], the author investigated interactions between re-
serves and energy and showed the necessity to consider not
only energy but also reserves by location. In the current prac-
tice, the congestion management schemes have no guarantees
that some lines in the system will not become congested
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1Here by forward time markets we mean markets in which commodities
traded at time instant t are to be delivered in some future time t+ τ , with
τ > 0.
during provision of ancillary services. In other words, spatial
dimension of AS is still an unsolved problem which has
been recognized as such in the recent reports of European
Network of Transmission System Operators [3], [4]. The
problem formulated and solved in this paper is in line with
the above mentioned needs. The contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows: 1) problem formulation of price-
based (market-based), economically optimal and reliable
spatial distribution of power balancing control services; 2)
introduction of notion of nodal prices for the control services;
3) mathematical characterization of optimal nodal prices for
control services, which is constructive. The obtained results
are in particular important for the future power systems with
large amount of uncontrollable renewable energy sources,
which will be characterized by increase of uncertainties
in any forward-time energy prosumption planning, while
controllable power will become more scarce [5].
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
1) Notation: We use 1n and 0n to denote a column
vector with n elements all being equal to 1, and a col-
umn vector with n elements all being equal to 0, respec-
tively. Let c1, . . . , cn be matrices / vectors with the same
number of columns, or scalars, then col(c1, . . . , cn) :=(
c>1 . . . c
>
n
)>
. The convex hull of a set C is denoted by
conv C.
2) Transmission system topology: Consider a connected
undirected graph G = (V, E) as an abstraction of transmis-
sion network of a power system. Here, V = {1, . . . , N} is the
set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V is the set of undirected edges.
We associate the nodes with the buses in the transmission
network and the edges with the power lines of the network.
We consider the network to consist of a set of control areas
A = {A1, . . .AM}. Each control area Ai ∈ A is defined
through a set of nodes and edges, i.e. we have Ai = {Vi, Ei},
where Vi ⊆ V and Ei ⊆ E . Each node belongs to one and
only one control area.
Assumption II.1 The numbering of nodes in the network is
such that the first N1 nodes belong to the control area 1, the
next N2 nodes belong to the control area 2, etc. 2
Remark II.2 Provision of balancing control ancillary ser-
vices is performed independently within each control area in
such a way that all the power imbalances which originate
in one control area will eventually be compensated for by
activation of ancillary services in that same control area. 2
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3) Nodal power injections: At a discrete time instant
k ∈ Z, with each node i ∈ V we associate the nodal power
injection p˜i(k) ∈ R. Positive value of p˜i(k) corresponds to a
flow of power into the network (production), while negative
value implies that the power is extracted from the network
(consumption).
4) Power flow equations: With δ˜i(k) denoting the voltage
phase angle at node i ∈ V and with the abbreviations p˜(k) =
col(p˜1(k), . . . , p˜N (k)), δ˜(k) = col(δ˜1(k), . . . , δ˜N (k)), the
DC power flow model is given by
p˜(k) = Bδ˜(k), (1)
where B is the susceptance matrix. Vector of line power
flows p˜E(k) for all lines in the network can be written in the
following compact form
p˜E(k) = Lδ˜(k), (2)
where L is a fixed matrix which depends on susceptances of
lines and network topology.
5) Time scale separation: We distinguish two time scales,
which we will conveniently call the energy time scale and
the power time scale. Energy time scale is a discrete time
scale with the sampling period of for example 15, 30 or 60
minutes (different values can be found in different countries),
which is the market trading interval for forward time markets.
For convenience, we will always use the symbol k to denote
a time instant on the energy time scale (k ∈ Z+). With the
term power injection p˜(k) on the energy time scale, we mean
the predicted and market contracted average power injection
(market contracted energy for the time interval k divided
by the length of the interval). Power time scale is the time
scale on which real-time power balancing control loops are
active and, in this paper, power time scale will be considered
as continuous2 time t ∈ R. Let t = 0 be initiated at the
beginning of the discrete time interval k = 0, and define the
function κ : R+ → Z+ as κ(t) = b tTs c, where b·c is the
floor function and Ts is the length of the time interval on
the energy time scale. If κ(t) = k, this means that the time
instant t on the power time scale is within the k-th interval
on the energy time scale.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Suppose that at time t on the power time scale the
system is in a steady state. Then the vector of nodal power
injections p(t) can be represented as p(t) = p˜(k) + d(t)
where κ(t) = k and d(t) := col(d1(t), . . . , dN (t)) is the
vector of nodal power injections unpredicted in forward time
(e.g., during future production scheduling on the energy time
scale). The steady state power balance condition states that
1>Np(t) = 1
>
N (p˜(k) + d(t)) = 0, and since 1
>
N p˜(k) = 0
(energy markets are balanced), we have 1>N d(t) = 0. The
vector d(t) can further be decomposed into uncontrollable
and controllable part, i.e. d(t) = q(t) + f(t), where q(t) is
2In practice, real-time power balancing controllers are in fact implemented
in discrete time with the sampling time of 1 or 4 seconds. For the results
of this paper, a step from the continuous time to such discrete time is
straightforward.
the vector of uncontrollable disturbances (e.g., wind turbine
productions, households loads) while the vector f(t) is a vec-
tor of controllable power injections which have been brought
on-line via real-time feedback loops through activation of
AS control options with the goal to counteract q(t). Note
that in general q(t) + f(t) 6= 0, but 1>N (q(t) + f(t)) = 0.
Both q(t) and f(t) cause deviations in lines power flows
from the power flows predicted during the energy market
clearing ((1) and (2)). In general, if the entries in the vector
q(t) are sufficiency large, the new equilibrium point might
be such that some lines in the transmission network are
overloaded, what jeopardizes the system’s integrity. Note
that such situation is more likely to happen if in some
location A in the network there are relatively cheap AS
options available in large amount, while large uncertainties
and power fluctuations are characterizing some other location
B. The AS market outcome will tend to allocate large amount
of AS from location A. However, in some cases it might be
impossible to transfer this power to the location B when
needed, if the transmission network power flow limits are
sufficiently low. To be able to account for the reliable spatial
distribution of ancillary services in the system, we need to
have an appropriate model which captures the following: 1)
the set of possible (or likely) values of q(t); 2) the relation
of f(t) with respect to q(t).
A. Uncertainties in nodal injections.
We assume that we have the following knowledge of the
uncertainties in nodal power injections. With some prede-
fined, sufficiently high probability, we have that q(t) ∈ Q(k)
for κ(t) = k, where the uncertainty set Q(k) is parametrised
as follows
Q(k) = { q | q = R(k)w, w ∈ W(k) ⊂ Rm} (3)
and 0 ∈ Q(k). Furthermore, the set W(k) is assumed to be
defined as a convex hull of a finite set of vertices, that is,
W(k) = conv{w1(k), . . . , wT (k)}, (4)
where wi(k) ∈ Rm, i = 1, . . . , T are given.
In the remainder of the paper, we use the superscripts +
and − to indicate that restoring the balance of the considered
node will require positive and negative power controllable
power inflow, receptively. More precisely, for negative qi(t),
that is, for q(t) ∈ [−r+i , 0], r+ > 0, nodal power balance
will be restored with positive power inflow into to the node,
either by direct power injection in the node, or by inflow
through the connecting power lines. With this interpretation
r+i can be thought of as a request for up-regulating ancillary
services.
B. The participation function
The AS provision takes place on the power time scale,
while the AS markets clearing is done in forward time
on the energy time scale. For the AS market clearing we
therefore require an appropriate energy time scale model of
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the power time scale processes. Here we will use the closed-
loop steady-state relations between q and f are a suitable
model for this purpose.
Let a+i (k) and a
−
i (k) for i = 1, . . . , N be respec-
tively the amount of up-regulating and down-regulating
AS options scheduled and committed at node i. Further-
more, let a+(k) := col(a+1 (k), . . . , a
+
N (k)) and a
−(k) :=
col(a−1 (k), . . . , a
−
N (k)). Suppose that the power time signal
q(t) is constant and that the power system is stable. Than in
steady state the following holds
f(t) = γ
(
a+(k), a−(k), q(t)
)
(5)
for κ(t) = k and for some function γ. Note that in (5)
the augments a−(k) and a−(k) are related to the energy
time scale, while the argument q(t) is related to the power
time scale. Due to time scale separation, a−(k) and a−(k)
are treated as constant parameters in the power time scale.
We will call the function γ the participation function, as
it defines how the power injection fi(t) from controllable
power prosumption units located at node i participates in
covering for the possible imbalances caused by q(t). The
participation function depends on the spatial distribution of
scheduled AS services in the system, that is, it depends on
a−(k) and a−(k). By designing the real-time balancing con-
trol loops, we have the freedom to synthesize the structure of
the participation function γ (i.e, the type/class of the function
and the manner in which entries of a+(k) and a−(k) enter
the function γ), while in the forward time AS markets we
set the numerical values for a+(k) and a−(k), fully defining
γ as a function on power time scale.
C. Robust congestion constraints
Let l˜(k) and l(k) be elementwise positive vectors denoting
respectively the security line flow limits for i) energy market
clearing and ii) real-time control for all t where κ(t) = k.
During the market clearing for the time interval k, the
predicted line power flows have to be lower than l˜(k), i.e,
with reference to (1) and (2), the market cleared power
prosumptions p˜(k) have to satisfy p˜E(k) = Lδ˜(k) ≤ l˜(k).
In real-time however, the line flow limits l(k) apply, where
l˜(k) < l(k) (elementwise inequality), i.e., Lδ(t) ≤ l(k)
for κ(t) = k and p(t) = Bδ(t). In this paper we require
the real-time congestion constraint Lδ(t) ≤ l(k) to be
satisfied for t, κ(t) = k, for which the system is in steady-
state. Stated differently, for any admissible constant valued
disturbance with q(t) ∈ Q(k), the power system has to have
an asymptotically stable equilibrium point for which the line
power flow limits l(k) are not violated. Suppose that the
energy market is cleared with p˜(k) and corresponding δ˜(k).
Let ∆l(k) := l(k) − Lδ˜(k), i.e., ∆l(k) is the additional
line power flow capacity remaining after the energy market
clearing.
We define the robust congestion constraints as follows.
For all constant valued q(t) ∈ Q(k), the total nodal power
injections p(t) = p˜(k) + q(t) + f(t) on the power time
scale, in steady-state, must not induce power flows which
exceed the line flow limits l(k). To further formalize this
notion, consider first the power balance condition which
states p˜(k) + q(t) + f(t) = B(δ˜(k) + δ(t)) what with (1)
further implies q(t) + f(t) = Bδ(t) for some δ(t). With (3)
and (5), the robust congestion constraints are formalized as
follows
Lδ ≤ ∆l(k) for all δ ∈ D(k) (6)
where
D(k) := {δ | R(k)w + γ
(
a+(k), a−(k), R(k)w
)
= Bδ,
w ∈ W(k) },
(7)
that is, D(k) is the set of all possible steady-state voltage
phase angles when uncontrollable disturbances q vary in
Q(k) and the feedback control law implies (5) in steady-
state. Note that other defining elements in (6), (7) are fixed
(l(k) is fixed the moment the energy market is cleared) before
the AS market clearing takes place.
D. The AS nodal pricing problem
1) Ancillary services bids: Market agents submit the
quantity-to-price bids for AS options for some future time
interval k on the energy time scale. We assume that each
market agent specifies the location (node) of the offered AS
in the bid. By aggregating all the bids related to some node
i, the aggregated quantity-to-price up-regulating and down-
regulating AS bids are respectively denoted by β+i (a
+
i (k))
and β−i (a
−
i (k)). For s ∈ {+,−}, the interpretation of
βsi (a
s
i (k)) is as follows: if the AS price at the node i would
be λsi , then the market agents are willing to reserve the total
amounts of a˜+i , a˜
−
i of ancillary services, where β
s
i (a˜
s
i ) = λ
s
i ,
s ∈ {+,−}.
2) Perfect competition and the AS costs: We assume
conditions of perfect competition in the AS markets, see
e.g. [6]. This implies that the market agents are price takers
and their optimal bidding strategy is to bid the incremental
AS costs, i.e., we have βsi (a
s
i ) =
∂Jsi (a
s
i )
∂asi
, where Ji(asi )
is the cost for allocating and providing the amount asi of
the corresponding AS options. Therefore, from the submitted
bids, we can devise the AS costs as Jsi (a
s
i ) =
∫ asi
asi
βsi (x)dx,
where asi is the lower bound on quantity a
s
i in the offered
bid.
Remark III.1 Assumption of perfect competition implies
that the functions Jsi (·) are convex functions for all i ∈
{1, . . . , N}, [6].
3) Accumulation of AS options: Remark II.2 implies that
to compensate for uncertainties in some control area Ai, we
have to accumulate amount of AS options sufficient to cover
for the worst case imbalance scenario in that control area.
With Assumption II.1 this requirement is formalized as fol-
lows. Let eAi := col(0(N1+...+Ni−1),1Ni ,0(Ni+1+...+NM )),
and let
r+Ai := max
(
e>AiRw1, . . . , e
>
AiRwT
)
, i = 1, . . . ,M (8a)
r−Ai := |min
(
e>AiRw1, . . . , e
>
AiRwT
)|, i = 1, . . . ,M, (8b)
where wi are the imbalance vertices from (3), (4). Then
r+Ai and r
−
Ai denote respectively the total required amount
of up-regulating and down-regulating AS services in the
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control area Ai. Note that for each i, both r+Ai and r−Ai are
nonnegative (r+Ai is nonegative since 0 ∈ Q(k)). Finally,
with the abbreviations E := col(e>A1 , . . . , e
>
AM ) and r
s :=
col(rsA1 , . . . , r
s
AM ), s ∈ {+,−}, the requirements for AS
accumulation are written in the following compact form
Ea+ = r+, Ea− = r−. (9)
4) The pricing problem: We are now finally ready to
formalize the pricing problem as follows.
Problem III.2 Let p˜(k) and ∆l(k) be given after the en-
ergy market closure and let Q(k) be given in the form of
(3), (4). Given the set of AS bids {β+i , β−i }i∈{1,...,N} and
the structure of the participation function γ(·, ·, ·), deter-
mine a vector of up-regulating AS nodal prices λ+(k) :=
col(λ+1 (k), . . . , λ
+
N (k)) and a vector of down-regulating AS
prices λ−(k) := col(λ−1 (k), . . . , λ
−
N (k)), so that when each
market agent is committed for provision of the AS options
a+i = a˜
+
i , a
−
i = a˜
−
i according to its bids, i.e., when
β+i (a˜
+
i ) = λ
+
i , β
−
i (a˜
−
i ) = λ
−
i , i = 1, . . . , N , the following
is achieved: the total AS costs
∑N
i=1(Ji(a˜
+
i (k))+Ji(a˜
−
i (k)))
are minimizied subject to the robust congestion constraints
(6), (7).
IV. THE PARTICIPATION FUNCTION
In the remainder, we will drop the reference to the
time instant k on the energy time scale, as all energy
time scale quantities are related to the same k. Having in
mind Assumption II.1, let qA1(t) := col(q1(t), . . . , qN1(t)),
qA2(t) := col(qN1+1(t), . . . , qN1+N2(t)), etc. Note
that q(t) = col(qA1(t), . . . , qAM (t)). Analogously,
let us define fA1(t) := col(f1(t), . . . , fN1(t)),
fA2(t) := col(fN1+1(t), . . . , fN1+N2(t)), etc. Then
f = col(fA1 , . . . , fAM ). Finally, in the same manner we
define a+Ai and a
+
Ai as respectively vector of AS options
of up-regulating services and down-regulating services, for
the i-th control area. We have col(a+A1 , . . . , a
+
AM ) = a
+,
col(a−A1 , . . . , a
−
AM ) = a
−. In the standard real-time control
structure, each control area internally balances its power
deviations by activating the AS options from within the
area, that is,
1>NifAi(t) = −1>NiqAi(t). (10)
More precisely, for each control area in steady-state we have
the following relations
fAi(t) =
{
−α+Ai(aA+i ) qAi(t) if qAi(t) ≤ 0
−α−Ai(a−Ai) qAi(t) if qAi(t) > 0
(11)
where qAi(t) := 1
>
Ni
qA1(t) is the total aggregated power de-
viation in the area, while α+Ai(aA+i ) ∈ R
Ni and α−Ai(a
−
Ai) ∈
RNi are the up-regulating and down-regulating participation
vector, respectively. Up-regulating participation vector is
used to distribute the total uncontrollable deviation qAi(t)
over the set of controllable prosumptions, when qAi(t) is
nonpositive, that is, when there is a lack of power in the con-
trol area. Lack of power implies activation of up-regulating
AS services, and therefore the participation vector α+Ai(aA+i )
is a function of a+Ai only. Analogous holds for the down-
regulating participation vector α−Ai(aA−i ), which is used in
case of power surplus. The j-th entry of a participation vector
defines a fraction of total imbalance qAi(t) that is covered by
activating controllable prosumption at the j-th node of that
control area. This fraction depends on relative contribution
of (the scheduled AS options at) that node in the sum of
all accumulated AS options in the control area. With the AS
accumulation constraints (9), we have
α+Ai(aA+i
) = a+Ai ·
1
r+Ai
, α−Ai(aA−i
) = a−Ai ·
1
r−Ai
. (12)
With respect to (9) and (12) note that i-th entry of the vector
Eas is precisely equal to 1>Nia
s
Ai , and therefore 1
>
Ni
asAi =
rsAi , where s ∈ {+,−}. Finally, note that by construction
we have 1>Niα
s
Ai(aAsi ) = 1, what is in accordance with
the balancing condition (10). In a more compact way, the
relations (11) can be written in the following equivalent form
fAi(t) = −α+Aiq+Ai(t)− α−Aiq−Ai(t) (13)
where q+Ai(t) := min(qAi(t), 0) and q
−
Ai := max(qAi(t), 0).
Finally, for the overall network consisting of M control areas
we have
f(t) = −Λ+(a+)q+(t)− Λ−(a−)q−(t) (14)
where Λ+(a+) := diag(α+A1 , . . . , α
+
AM ), Λ
−(a−) :=
diag(α−A1 , . . . , α
−
AM ), q
+(t) = col(q+A1(t), . . . , q
+
AM (t)),
q−(t) = col(q−A1(t), . . . , q
−
AM (t)), that is, the participation
function is given by
γ(a+, a−, q(t)) = −Λ+(a+)q+(t)− Λ−(a−)q−(t). (15)
The steady-state related participation function is ensured
by using the standard real-time secondary control solution,
see e.g. [1] for details. With ACEi(t) denoting the real-time
measured “area control error” value of the i-th control area,
the secondary controller which guarantees relation (13) in
steady-state is given by
fAi(t) =
{
−α+AikI
∫
ACEi(t)dt for
∫
ACEi(t)dt ≤ 0
−α−AikI
∫
ACEi(t)dt for
∫
ACEi(t)dt > 0
(16)
where kI is the controller gain. Alternatives to the standard
real-time control structure can be found e.g., in [7], [8].
For all alternative real-time control schemes the participation
function can be derived and the results of this paper can be
modified (in a quite straightforward way) to solve optimal
AS spatial distribution is such scenarios as well.
V. THE NODAL PRICING SOLUTION
With wt, t = 1, . . . , T defined as in (3) and (4), and
with the abbreviations qt := Rwt, consider the following
optimization problem, which is closely related to the pricing
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problem, i.e. to Problem III.2
min
a+,a−,{δt}t∈{1,...,T}
N∑
i=1
(
J+i (a
+
i ) + J
−
i (a
−
i )
)
, (17a)
subject to
qt − Λ+(a+)q+t − Λ−(a−)q−t = Bδt, t = 1, . . . , T
(17b)
Lδt ≤ ∆l, t = 1, . . . , T (17c)
Ea+ = r+ (17d)
Ea− = r− (17e)
where q+t and q
−
t are respectively determined from q+(t)
and q−(t) by taking q(t) = qt (see Section IV).
Note that in the optimization problem (17) instead of the
original robust congestion constraints (6) and (7), we have
used the constraints (17b), (17c), which are derived from (7)
evaluated at T imbalances vertices. This is justified based on
the following lemma.
Lemma V.1 Let f(x, y) and g(x, y) be linear functions in
both x and y. Then f(x˜, y) = 0, g(x˜, y) ≤ 0 hods for some x˜
and for all y ∈ conv{y1, . . . , yN} if and only if f(x˜, yi) = 0,
g(x˜, yi) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. 2
With {τt}t=1,...,T , τt ∈ RN , {µt}t=1,...,T , µt ∈ RN ,
σ+ ∈ RM , σ− ∈ RM denoting the Lagrange multipliers,
the Lagrangian associated with problem (17) is
L =
N∑
i=1
(
J+i (a
+
i ) + J
−
i (a
−
i )
)
+
T∑
t=1
µ>t
(
Lδt −∆l
)
+
T∑
t=1
τ>t
(
qt − Λ+(a+)q+t − Λ−(a−)q−t −Bδt
)
+ (σ+)>
(
Ea+ − r+)+ (σ−)>(Ea− − r−). (18)
Proposition V.2 For t = 1, . . . , T , let z+Ai,t := 1Ni
(q+Ai,t)
r+Ai
,
z−Ai,t := 1Ni
(q−Ai,t)
r−Ai
, where q+Ai,t and q
+
Ai,t are respectively
determined from q+Ai(t) and q
+
Ai(t) by taking q(t) = qt and let
z+t := col(z
+
A1,t, . . . , z
+
AM ,t), z
−
t := col(z
−
A1,t, . . . , z
−
AM ,t).
Then the the optimal nodal prices for AS are given as follows
λ+ = −E>σ˜+ +
T∑
t=1
τ˜t ◦z+t , λ− = −E>σ˜−+
T∑
t=1
τ˜t ◦z−t . (19)
where σ˜+, σ˜−+ and {τ˜t}t=1,...,T are the optimal values
of the corresponding dual variables in the Lagrange dual
problem with Lagrangian defined by (18), while ◦ denotes the
elementwise (Hadamard) product of vectors.
Proof: With assumption of perfect competition (see
Remark III.1), the optimization problem (17) is convex with
satisfied Slater’s constraint qualification, what implies that
strong duality holds. Let j be a node which belongs to
the i-th control area, i.e., j ∈ Ai. Then a subset of the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions is given
as follows (obtained from ∂L∂asj = 0)
Jsj (a
s
j)
∂asj
+ σ˜si −
T∑
t=1
τ˜t,j ·
(q+Ai,t)
r+Ai
= 0 (20)
where σsi is the i-th element of σ˜
s and τ˜t,j is the j-th element
of τ˜t, while s{+,−}. Now, since J
s
j (a
s
j)
∂asj
= βsj (s
s
j) (see
Section III-D.2) and since βsj (s
s
j) = λ
s
j (see Problem III.2),
we have that λsj = −σ˜si +
∑T
t=1 τ˜t,j ·
(q+Ai,t)
r+Ai
= 0. The
equalities (19) are then compact expressions for the overall
network of here derived price relations.
Proposition V.3 Optimal nodal prices have the same value
for all nodes in the same control area (i.e., there is a unique
price per control area) in case that, in optimum, line flow
limits are inactive for all lines in the system and for all
q(t) ∈ Q(k). If at least one line flow limit becomes active
for some q(t) ∈ Q(k), prices across nodes in a control area
have in general different values.
VI. EXAMPLE
Fig. 1. Network topology.
In the presented example we have used the detailed
dynamical model (with in total 64 power generating units)
of the Dutch power grid, developed and verified on real-
life measurements. The transmission network topology is
presented in Figure 1. The Netherlands (NL) (green areain
the figure) is modeled by 8 nodes and is considered as a
singe control area. We present the market clearing results
for both energy and AS markets, with the aim to illustrate
in which way is nodal pricing in AS markets (novel notion
developed in this paper) similar to the nodal pricing in
energy market (well known and in practice used notion, see
e.g. [9]). The results of the simulated processes on both
the energy time scale and the power time scale (real-time)
are presented. In real-time, the system has been constantly
under influence of unpredicted changes in loads and power
productions from wind turbines. The uncertainty set Q of
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nodal power injections has been modeled by perturbations
of up to 20% of uncontrollable power prosumption at each
node.
Fig. 2. Cleared energy prices (Euro/MWh) over 24 hours. Legend indicates
the node numbers.
Fig. 3. Power flows (MW) in the lines (8 lines within NL) as scheduled
during energy market clearing. Legend indicates the line numbers.
The simulated outcome of the market clearing prices for
energy within the Netherlands are presented in Figure 2,
while the corresponding flows in the lines are presented
in Figure 3. The simulation considers period of 24 hours,
with time-step on the energy time scale being one hour
(k = 1, . . . , 24). When there is no unique price in the
system, it must be that at least one tie-line in the transmission
network is at its power flow limit (nominal power flow limit
= l˜(k)). In Figures 2 and 3 this can be observed for the
hours 10 to 18. In that time interval power flow in line 5
is, according to the economically optimal market clearing
results, at its nominal power flow limit of 2000 MW and there
is no unique price in the system (see Figure 2). In case of
AS markets, the situation is similar and described as follows.
In Figure 5 we can observe power flows and the uncertainty
power flow tube in the congestion critical line (line 5). Note
that when, in Figure 5, the uncertainty tube touches the
security line flow limit (hour 9, i.e. around 3×104 seconds in
Figure 5) we no longer have unique market clearing price for
AS in the control area (see Proposition V.3), but each node
in general has different AS price (Figure 4). The analogy
with the energy market results (Figure 2 and 3) is obvious.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have formulated the problem of optimal and reliable
spatial distribution of power balancing ancillary services in
electrical power system and have presented a solution based
on a novel notion of AS nodal prices.
Fig. 4. Trajectory of optimal up-regulating AS prices (Euro/MWh) over
24 hours. Legend on the right indicates node numbers.
Fig. 5. Green line: tie-line power flow as calculated (predicted) during
the energy market clearing. Blue line: real-time realized (simulated) power
flow in the tie-line. Deviation of the blue line from the green line originates
both from unpredicted changes in load/wind and from activation of AS.
Gray shaded area: is the “uncertainty tube”. It is the area for which we
can guarantee that the corresponding tie-line power flow will remain in
(possibly after a transient excursion outside that area). We guarantee that
the AS control action is such that it will not allow power flows to stay
outside gray area for longer time periods, or more precisely, that trajectories
always converge to within the gray areas. Black dashed line: Nominal line
power flow limit = l˜(k) (valid and applied in the energy market clearing)
of 2000 MW. Red dashed line: Security line power flow limit = l(k) (valid
and applied in the AS markets clearing) of 2250 MW.
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